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Abstract
This article looks at the influence of the Zimmerwald Conference of 1915
on the peace policies of the Petrograd Soviet, the Socialist-Revolutionaries,
the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks after February 1917. It highlights
the problems involved in simultaneously trying to defend a revolution,
work for a just international peace, and maintain the front in a war which
no longer makes any sense. It suggests that insisting on ‘peace without
annexations and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of nations’
was not realistic given Russia’s war exhaustion and the war aims of the
other belligerents. However, it also shows that no other peace aim had any
political support within Russia.
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The history of World War One is littered with peace initiatives. States,
international bodies, religious institutions, political movements and ad hoc
committees all tried at various times to help put an end to the slaughter.
Most of these initiatives also had some ulterior political motive, whether
it was to end the war to the advantage of one or other belligerent side or
simply to increase the weight and prestige of the sponsor of the peace
move. Few had any lasting relevance – they were floated, promoted, and
quietly ditched when they failed to gain much traction.
Socialist bodies also put forward peace initiatives, often aimed not only
at ending the senseless bloodshed, but also at working towards recon-
structing the socialist international, which had been shattered following
the dé bâ cle of 1914. By far the most significant of these initiatives was
the international conference organised in September 1915 at Zimmerwald,
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near Berne, by the Swiss labour leader Robert Grimm and others. The
slogans and demands of this conference – notably ‘peace without annexa-
tions or indemnities’ – gained wide acceptance among Russian socialists in
particular after 1915. Following the fall of the Tsar in February 1917, the
Petrograd Soviet was headed largely by former adherents of Zimmerwald,
and ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’ became a cornerstone of
the Soviet’s position on the war. On this, there was widespread consensus.
Unfortunately, there was little consensus on the more practical questions
of how to achieve such a peace, and what revolutionary Russia should do
in the meantime. This article looks at some of the debates among Russian
revolutionaries in 1917 about the war and how to end it, and explores the
very real dilemmas they were trying to tackle.
I. Zimmerwald and Kiental
The story of the Second International’s failure in 1914 has been told many
times. Its 1907 Stuttgart congress had resolved that in the event of war
breaking out in Europe, socialists in and outside parliaments should ‘inter-
vene in favour of its speedy termination and … utilize the economic and
political crisis created by the war to rouse the masses and thereby to hasten
the downfall of capitalist class rule’.1 At Basel in 1912, the International
had reiterated that stance, and as late as 29 July 1914 its International
Socialist Bureau held its last great peace rally in Brussels, with speakers
from France, Germany, Britain, Russia, the Netherlands and Italy.2 By
early August 1914, as the war spread across Europe, the majority socialists
of most belligerent countries had quickly rallied to their respective flags,
and used their position to help to damp down class struggle and rally their
labour movements for the war effort.
The anti-war minorities in the socialist parties were at first diso-
rientated, but before long they began to re-establish contacts. Neutral
Switzerland was important here in several respects: its geographi-
cal position (it could be reached from France, Germany, Austria and
Italy), its traditional role as a place of exile for Russian revolutionaries,
its relatively high level of political freedoms, and the keenness of Swiss
socialists like Grimm to facilitate the reconstitution of socialism as an
internationalist movement. Grimm’s newspaper Berner Tagwacht grew
in circulation to become one of the most important German-language
socialist-internationalist publications during the war, while Berne and its
recently-opened Volkshaus were the venue for several international gath-
erings in the course of 1915.3 The most significant of these gatherings,
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first mooted by the Italian Socialist Party, brought together 38 leading
European anti-war socialists in the little hillside village of Zimmerwald,
near Berne, between 5–8 September 1915.
The manifesto adopted at Zimmerwald called on the working class ‘to
reorganise and begin the struggle for peace’, and continued:
This struggle is also the struggle for liberty, for brotherhood of nations,
for socialism. The task is to take up this fight for peace – for a peace
without annexations or war indemnities … 4
Of all the national contingents, the Russian’s was one of the largest and
most representative of the diversity of the country’s anti-war left. It was
also certainly the most illustrious: there were the Bolsheviks Lenin and
Zinoviev, the Mensheviks Pavel Aksel’rod and Yuliy Martov, the then
non-aligned Trotsky, as well as Viktor Chernov and Mark Natanson for
the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs). Other notable representatives were
Karl Radek (Poland), Giacinto Serrati and Angelica Balabanoff (Italy)
and Christian Rakovsky (Romania). Many of the future leaders of the
Petrograd Soviet in 1917 were there, as were many future founders of the
Communist International in 1919.
Lenin and his supporters at Zimmerwald found the manifesto unsatis-
factory for its failure to denounce opportunism in the socialist movement
strongly enough. Their minority ‘Zimmerwald Left’ group stressed the
need to replace ‘civil peace’ with ‘civil war’ although quite what they
meant by that was not fully spelled out. A follow-up conference at
Kiental in April 1916 produced resolutions somewhat closer in spirit to
the Zimmerwald Left. The Kiental manifesto, adopted on 1 May 1916,
demanded an immediate armistice, declaring that ‘the hatred towards the
war and the will to social retaliation is growing in all countries … the hour
of peace between the peoples is inevitably approaching’.5
Internationalism was not simply about avoiding chauvinism and refus-
ing to blame the war entirely on one side or another. The war was an
international calamity, caused by an international system (imperialist
capitalism), and was to be ended by the international efforts of the work-
ing-class and socialist movements in overthrowing their militarist rulers.
The socialists who gathered at Zimmerwald and Kiental did not consider
the possibility of the ruling militarist clique being overthrown in only one
state, and the question of how the newly revolutionary state should relate
to its military opponents.
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II. Russian socialists and World War One
The outbreak of war had split the socialist movement in Russia, as it had
everywhere else, and the divisions over the war effort and whether to
support it cut across the existing factional divides. Those who supported
Russia’s war effort became known as ‘defencists’, while the ‘international-
ists’, regarded all the belligerent states as culpable and refused to support
their own ruling class against those of the Central Powers. Defencists
sometimes referred to all the internationalists as ‘defeatists’, but the wish
to see Russia militarily defeated was a minority position among the inter-
nationalists. Lenin argued at the end of September 1914 that ‘the defeat
of the tsarist monarchy … would be the lesser evil’,6 and around the same
time raised the slogan of ‘turning the imperialist war into a civil war’.7
Positions like this put Lenin and his supporters on the extreme left of the
internationalist socialist spectrum.
As a whole, Russia’s socialists tended to be less swayed than the social-
ists in the other warring states by the patriotic fervour of August 1914 and
after. They had little stake in the existing order, and even if Russia were
militarily defeated, it was not likely to be overrun. Even figures like the
defencist Menshevik Aleksandr Potresov, who supported the war effort
from the outset, rejected the ‘civil peace’ policy adopted by the major-
ity socialists in Germany and France towards their respective states and
capitalists. Potresov envisaged a fight against both German semi-absolut-
ism and militarism at the front and Russian autocracy in the rear.8 For its
part, the Russian state showed little interest at first in trying to co-opt
the labour movement for the war effort after the Western European
fashion. Instead, on the outbreak of war many socialist leaders in Russia –
Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs – were rounded up and sent into internal
exile in Siberia. Some were mobilised for war service.
As the details of the Zimmerwald conference and manifesto reached
Siberia towards the end of 1915, they met with broad sympathy from
many of these exiles. In the city of Irkutsk, an informal internationalist
group of social democrats – including Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and non-
aligned – gathered around the leading Menshevik Irakliy Tsereteli, while
a parallel grouping of internationalist SRs formed around Abram Gots.
Collectively, these currents came to be dubbed ‘Siberian Zimmerwaldists’.
Although these labels were used at the time, they can mask the flu-
idity of Russian socialism at this time. In his memoir of the revolution
Tsereteli recalled socialist gatherings between 1914 and 1917 as little
more than ‘exchanges between individuals or groups, lost in exile, in the
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underground, or in emigration’.9 He noted that not one of the revolu-
tionary parties managed to maintain regularly functioning organisational
structures during the war. Moreover, disagreements over the war did not
necessarily result in formal splits or breakdowns in political relationships
within those political groups which continued to function in Russia. For
all the incessant agitation by Lenin and Zinoviev from Switzerland for a
complete rupture with ‘opportunism’, many Bolsheviks in Russia con-
tinued to work with whatever other socialists were at hand. Mensheviks
were even less inclined to break completely with their comrades. In Tiflis,
Georgia, the internationalist majority in the local Menshevik organisation
even voted funds to allow the defencist minority to publish a paper.10
The fluid, tangled, and ambiguous nature of the relationships within
the Russian revolutionary milieu would have a profound effect on the
behaviour and positions of the socialist leaders of the soviets following
the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917.
III. The first weeks of the revolution
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the fall of the Tsar and
the outbreak of revolution in 1917 was a manifestation of Russia’s war
exhaustion. That was not necessarily how it was perceived at the time.
The generals who accepted Nicholas’s abdication did so in the hope that
it would provide a fillip to the war effort. Although there was certainly a
strong desire for peace among the workers and soldiers who came together
across Russia to found soviets in March 1917, they did not immediately
adopt internationalist anti-war positions. In Kazan’, on the Volga, for
example, a leaflet issued in the first days of March by the local execu-
tive committee of the soldiers’ and workers’ soviet was entitled ‘Freedom,
Victory and Full People’s Power’, and argued that, in view of the aggres-
sive nature of German militarism, ‘only a victorious end to the war can
secure the freedom we have won’.11
The revolution gave soldiers and sailors real political weight. The fall of
Tsarism had been precipitated by a mutiny in the Petrograd garrison. Across
Russia, soldiers sent representatives to the soviets, and were the predomi-
nant force in many of them. The first chairman of the Kazan’ Soviet, for
example, was one Second Lt. Poplavsky. Soldiers’ and sailors’ committees in
the army and navy claimed all sorts of rights, including the power to arrest
senior officers suspected of ‘counterrevolutionary’ attitudes. Central and
local governments and soviet bodies always had to take account of the mood
of the forces in their decisions. And, as 1917 wore on, power dissipated and
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the state and administrative machinery crumbled, deploying bodies of armed
men increasingly became the main means for making things happen.
The first days of the revolution gave the defencists in Russian socialism
some weighty arguments. The internationalist social-democrat Nikolay
Sukhanov recalled that in Petrograd, during those first days, he had been
persuaded to act against his own views and try to dampen down anti-war
sentiments on the streets, on the grounds that ‘if it began as a movement
against the war, the revolution would immediately destroy itself through
internal dissentions’.12 At this stage it was essential to keep the army as a
whole, not just the mutinous Petrograd garrisons, on the side of the revo-
lution, so that armed force could not be used to restore the old regime.
A Provisional Government had been rapidly formed in Russia follow-
ing the fall of the Tsar. It was composed of liberal politicians from the
Tsar’s pre-war consultative parliament (the Duma), and took office with
the consent of the Petrograd Soviet, formed at the same time. Some of
these liberal politicians imagined, in this early phase, that the armed forces
of free Russia would fight as well as those of France. In early March the
Provisional Duma Committee published an educational pamphlet on the
French army, The Republican Soldier, by M. Matveev, a Russian journalist
with the French forces. It explained how, despite France’s republican civil
equality, discipline was paramount in the French army. This, Matveev
urged, should be the model for the armed forces of revolutionary Russia,
which, alongside their French comrades ‘as brothers and allies will not
stop on their path until complete victory is achieved’.13
A problem with ‘victory’ was that it had never been clearly defined. It
was well known that the Tsarist government had made various agreements
with the Entente about war aims, and that it had sought control of the
Dardanelles. After February 1917 this aim became the totemic example
of the predatory Tsarist foreign policy which revolutionary Russia had to
renounce. The Petrograd Soviet, which until June generally spoke for all
the soviets across Russia, set out its own position on the war on 14 March
1917, proclaiming that
the time has come to begin a decisive struggle against the acquisitive
ambitions of the governments of all countries; the time has come for
the peoples to take into their own hands the decision of the question of
war and peace …
… the Russian democracy announces that it will oppose the policy
of conquest of its ruling classes by every means, and it summons the
peoples of Europe for common decisive action in favour of peace …
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The soviet called on the workers of Germany and Austria-Hungary to
‘throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule, as the Russian people have
cast off the Tsar’s autocracy’.14 The Menshevik Nikolay Chkheidze, in his
speech introducing the appeal in the Soviet, even made this a condition for
peace talks, declaiming theatrically ‘before speaking of peace, we are sug-
gesting that the Germans follow our example and overthrow Wilhelm …
if the Germans pay no attention to our appeal, then we shall fight for our
freedom until the last drop of blood’.15 This reflected the revolutionary
euphoria of the first weeks of the revolution, as well as the almost mes-
sianic view of the moral authority of revolutionary Russia which afflicted
the whole socialist spectrum. The appeal affirmed that Russia
will firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary attempts both
from within and without. The Russian revolution will not retreat before
the bayonets of conquerors, and will not permit itself to be crushed by
foreign military force.16
The soviet appeal was a well-crafted compromise. The reaffirmation of
the need for defence reassured not only the defencists among the soviet
parties, but also official Russia. The call for peace without annexations
(indemnities were not mentioned), and the call to revolution in Germany
and elsewhere were points to which Zimmerwaldians could readily sub-
scribe. From the left, Stalin editorialised in the Bolshevik paper Pravda
the next day, on 15 March
The revolutionary soldiers and officers who have overthrown the yoke
of tsarism will not quit their trenches so as to clear the place for German
or Austrian soldiers or officers … We cannot permit any disorganisa-
tion of the military forces of the revolution! War must be ended in
an organised way, by a pact among the peoples which have liberated
themselves, and not by subordination to the will of the neighbouring
conqueror and imperialist.17
In its turn the Provisional Government, under pressure from the soviet,
issued a declaration on war aims on 27 March, affirming that
the aim of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure
of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign ter-
ritories, but the establishment of a stable peace on the basis of the
self-determination of peoples.
Dilemmas of a ‘democratic peace’ 15
While the declaration stated that this ‘would be made the basis of the
foreign policy of the Provisional Government’, it added the seemingly
innocuous rider: ‘fully observing at the same time all obligations assumed
towards our Allies’.18 The SR paper Delo naroda greeted the Provisional
Government declaration ‘with a deep feeling of moral satisfaction’.19 The
Mensheviks’ Rabochaya gazeta expressed its ‘great satisfaction’, even
though it noted that the declaration ‘did not … do away with the aggres-
sive programme of the Allied powers, nor did it cancel the obligations of
Russia to fight for this programme’.20
At the end of March 1917, there seemed to be a broad consensus on
war and peace stretching from the liberals to the far left. However, this
consensus was more apparent than real, as several political crises would
soon show.
IV. Siberian Zimmerwaldists into revolutionary defencists
Before the overthrow of the Tsar, social-democratic defencism in Russia
had been hampered by the fact that there was little in the Russian social
order that social democrats thought worth defending. The revolution
changed all that. Russia had become a free country almost overnight,
but this precious freedom was fragile, threatened by restorationists
from within the country and the Central Powers from without. More
importantly, across the country socialists and revolutionaries had
gained not only freedom but also responsibility for the fate of Russia
– a country embroiled in a war which was not going at all well. As
Tsereteli observed in his memoir, commenting on the first days of the
revolution in Irkutsk, Siberia, ‘the revolution had inherited the war, and
had to continue to wage it actively until its conditions for peace could
be realised’.21
The revolution in Irkutsk was an important formative experience both
for Tsereteli and for central soviet policies between April and October
1917.22 For the first two weeks after the fall of Nicholas, Tsereteli had
been the leading figure in the three bodies which emerged to replace
the old regime locally: a Committee of Public Organisations, a Soviet
of Workers’ Deputies and a Military Organisation. Social democrats,
SRs, non-party people, representatives of local businesses and the previ-
ous local authorities had worked together in various combinations in
these bodies to run local affairs, maintain order, and stand guard against
counterrevolution. Siberian Zimmerwaldists had, in effect, taken over
the local administration. Tsereteli recalled that a few days after they had
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taken over, he was unexpectedly asked to decide whether military sup-
plies from Vladivostok should be allowed to pass through Irkutsk on the
way to the front. His decision that the freight should not be stopped, a
decision his colleagues supported, was, he concluded, ‘a psychological
turning-point, the start of that “revolutionary defencism” which pre-
dominated in the democratic milieu for the first eight months of the
revolution’.23
Tsereteli, Gots, and other Siberian exiles arrived in Petrograd from
Irkutsk at the end of March. As senior, albeit second-rank, representatives
of their respective parties, they rapidly assumed leading positions in the
Petrograd Soviet. The bloc they formed endured as the leading bloc until
the autumn. The top party leaders were out of the country, and did not
arrive back in Russia until days or even weeks later. Meanwhile, Siberian
Zimmerwaldism had largely transmuted into revolutionary defencism,
combining an insistence on a democratic peace with a concern that the
front must be maintained. It was a policy dictated by the circumstances in
which its proponents found themselves, but it had a very limited shelf life.
It committed Russia to continue to fight, but not in order to win, at a time
when both Russia’s allies and enemies were still committed to war until
victory – whatever ‘victory’ meant in practice.
V. Which way to peace?
Russia was not alone in needing peace in 1917. The war was taking its toll
on all the belligerents, but Russia’s need was more urgent, and was becom-
ing more so by the day. But how was peace to be achieved – through
victory, a settlement, or international revolution?
The option of an annexationist victory was effectively ruled out within
two months of the fall of Nicholas. Some liberal politicians, such as the
Provisional Government’s first foreign minister Pavel Milyukov, still
hoped for military victory and a share in a carve-up of the vanquished.
Milyukov did not consider that the government declaration of war aims
invalidated existing plans and treaties agreed with the Allies, and it was
no secret that he still wanted control of the Bosphorus. However, when
he (reluctantly) sent the statement on war aims to the Allied governments
with an explanatory note spelling out that the treaties still stood, there was
a storm of protest in Petrograd, with massive street demonstrations on 21
April. ‘Bourgeois’ demonstrators supporting Milyukov and demanding
war until victory clashed with workers and soldiers calling for Milyukov
to go, no annexations and an end to the war. Some demonstrators were
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armed and shots were fired. The ensuing political crisis put an end to
Milyukov’s ministerial career, and at the same time obliged the Menshevik
and SR leaders of the Petrograd Soviet to abandon their policy of standing
aside from government. On 5 May a coalition Provisional Government
was announced, with five representatives of the Soviet, including Chernov
and Tsereteli, and minus certain representatives of the right, most notably
Milyukov. In its initial declaration, the new coalition ‘reject[ed] … all
thought of a separate peace’, and ‘adopt[ed] openly as its aim the reestab-
lishment of a general peace … without annexations or indemnities, and
based on the right of nations to decide their own affairs’.24 It also under-
took to try to convince the Allies of the desirability of this approach to a
general peace. Annexationist victory had become politically off-limits in
Petrograd, and it was becoming clearer that the soldiers were, for the most
part, not inspired to fight for it.
Meanwhile, the internationalist camp in Russia had regrouped follow-
ing the defection of most of the Siberian Zimmerwaldists to the cause of
national defence. The return of Lenin and other Bolshevik é migré s from
Switzerland via Germany at the beginning of April played a key part in
this. Within 24 hours of arriving in Petrograd, Lenin had effectively scup-
pered an initiative meeting which aimed to reunify the entire Russian
Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP) – Bolsheviks, Mensheviks
and non-aligned. He did so by insisting on a policy of no support for the
Provisional Government and no concessions to revolutionary defencism.
For Lenin, the war would only become a worthwhile, revolutionary, war
on condition:
(a) that the power pass to the proletariat and the poorest sections of
the peasants aligned with the proletariat; (b) that all annexations be
renounced in deed and not in word; (c) that a complete break be effected
in actual fact with all capitalist interests.25
He followed this with a swipe at the editorial attitude up to that time of
the Bolshevik paper Pravda under Stalin and Lev Kamenev, dismissing
its calls for the capitalist Provisional Government to renounce seizures of
territory as ‘senseless’.26 Although Lenin initially presented these views as
merely his personal opinion, it was not long before Stalin and the previ-
ous Bolshevik leadership in Petrograd fell into line, and those Bolsheviks
who could not accept Lenin’s new intransigent policy quit his party.
Thereafter, the Bolsheviks were fully ‘internationalist’, although their
approach set them apart from other internationalists.
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The Mensheviks and SRs, on the other hand, were at sixes and sevens
on their attitudes to the war effort, their attitudes to the Allies, and
how best to try to end the war. The full range of opinions had been
expressed at the Petrograd SR conference on 3 April. Abram Gots,
introducing the resolution on the war, repeated all the international-
ist nostrums about the culpability of the ‘imperialist circles of all the
belligerent states’ for starting the war.27 However, Gots continued,
the responsibility the Russian democracy now bore for the fate of the
country and revolution ‘obliges us to reconsider our tactical attitude
to the war’.28 Gots proposed that the government should call a confer-
ence of the Allies to devise a non-annexationist peace programme, and
that there should be a conference of socialists of all belligerent coun-
tries to reconstruct the International. In the meantime, the front had
to be maintained. To defend Russia was to defend both the revolution
and the International, since, Gots argued, ‘Russian democracy is now
the mainstay of the international socialist movement, its main fortress
and bastion’.29 Gots’s speech and resolution summed up the tactical
approach of revolutionary defencism – a three-pronged policy of state
diplomacy, international socialist diplomacy and urging the troops to
hold the line at the front in the meantime.
Opposing Gots from the left at the conference, Boris Kamkov criti-
cised the continued alliance with Anglo-French imperialism, which made
a mockery of Russia’s renunciation of annexations. Kamkov urged that
the secret treaties between Tsarist Russia and the Allies be published, and
declared that the SRs’ task should be ‘to carry the revolutionary move-
ment into all countries’.30 Vladimir Trutovsky also urged that Russia
‘should throw off the yokes of the governments of England and France’
and, unusually, went further to make the normally taboo suggestion
that ‘we should conclude a separate peace with Germany if it renounces
indemnities and annexations’.31
An army officer, Vladimir Utgof, observed in the discussion that
‘although the army wants peace, it cannot just stand and do nothing,
“remain organised just where it is”, because that would be suicidal and
ruinous’.32 He was right. There was general consensus that the army
needed to be doing something, but little agreement on what, or, perhaps
more importantly, to what end. Rank-and-file soldiers and sailors were
also increasingly asking themselves what they were doing in the forces
and why. The lack of a clear answer fostered increasing tendencies
towards desertion and insubordination.
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VI. The Allies and their socialists
Once it had become clear in the Allied states that the Russian mon-
archy was gone for good, and that the Petrograd Soviet wielded real
influence in Russia, officially-sanctioned delegations of Allied majority
socialists hurried there in April and May 1917. They were led by figures
like the French socialist minister Albert Thomas, Emile Vandervelde
from Belgium, and the British minister Arthur Henderson, and their
main task was to bolster Russia’s war effort, encourage civil peace in
the rear and sell the line of ‘war until victory’ on behalf of their respec-
tive governments. They were not very warmly received by most of the
soviet parties, who were looking for allies for their own peace policy.33
It was only small groups on the right of the soviet spectrum, Georgiy
Plekhanov’s Edinstvo group and the People’s Socialists, who saw
eye-to-eye with the Allied majority socialists. Nonetheless, the revolu-
tionary defencist majority in the Soviet did not seek to break with the
Allies, but rather to persuade the Allies to renounce any annexationist
plans in their war aims, as part of the effort towards a just peace. They
also wanted support for a socialist peace conference, intended to be held
in Stockholm that summer. The diplomatic mission of the Allied social-
ists reinforced the idea, very attractive to all parties in the Soviet, that
revolutionary Russia and its socialists could play the key role in ending
the slaughter.
The projected peace conference, discussed below, was a cornerstone
of the soviet majority’s plans to end the war on acceptable terms. Getting
the Allied socialists on board with the idea was essential if international
socialist diplomacy was to work. Initially, at least, the soviet majority
had considerable success here. Marcel Cachin and Marius Moutet from
France were won over both to the conference and the peace formula, and
even Henderson overcame his initial reluctance to the idea.34 There was,
however, a trade-off. As Albert Thomas claimed at the Petrograd Soviet
on 29 May, shortly before his return to France: ‘the French socialists
undertook to compel the French government to renounce imperialist
war aims … on condition that Russia does not conclude a separate peace
and takes steps to maintain the real strength of its army’.35 He empha-
sised the efforts and political costs to the French socialists of fulfilling
this undertaking. For Thomas, the ostensible war aims could be tweaked,
so long as Russia continued to fight Germany.
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VII. The Mensheviks and their dilemmas
When the Mensheviks gathered for their ‘All-Russia Congress of the
RSDRP’ in early May 1917, the honeymoon period of the revolution
was already over. Tsereteli and Matvey Skobelev were now govern-
ment ministers, and therefore directly shared responsibility for Russia’s
foreign policy and military stance. At the same time, a semi-detached
opposition around Martov, the ‘Menshevik-Internationalists’, was
organising separately and maintaining a running critique of the official
party position.
The congress resolution on the war, moved by party leader Fedor Dan
on 9 May, very much echoed the Soviet declaration of 14 March. It called
for peace without annexations and indemnities on the grounds that
an end to the war by a decisive victory of one coalition of powers over
the other would serve as a source for renewed militarist chauvinism and
the weakening of the international proletarian movement.36
It is noteworthy that victory for the Allies was seen as no less dangerous
than victory for the Germans. The resolution called instead for a struggle
for ‘a general peace through the united efforts of the international pro-
letariat’, and explicitly rejected a separate peace on the grounds that it
would ‘give one group of powers the possibility of winning a decisive
victory over the other’.37 The party’s task was to ‘help defend the country
from the danger of a military rout’ and at the same time ‘launch the widest
and most energetic struggle for a general peace’.38
Unfortunately as time went on, the perspective of the Soviet declara-
tion was looking less and less plausible. Workers and their organisations
in the other belligerent countries had not heeded the Soviet’s call, and
continued to follow their imperialist leaders. Meanwhile, the ability of the
army to defend revolutionary Russia was increasingly in doubt.
In the congress discussion, both defencists and internationalists were
able to point out fatal flaws in the arguments and schemas of their oppo-
nents. The internationalist Osip Ermansky argued that the call to raise the
fighting capacity of the army ‘is destroying the work being done to recon-
struct the International’.39 On the defencist side, Aleksandr Potresov
pointed out that the internationalists
completely ignore the question of what we should do before peace is
achieved, if the international path of agreement between the proletarians
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of the interested countries … does not rapidly give tangible results,
does not stop the war, does not lead to this peace.40
Potresov supported the two-track approach of Dan’s resolution, albeit
with greater stress on the role of the army rather than that of the interna-
tional working class, but in his turn largely ignored the fact of that army’s
disintegration. A defencist delegate from the Dvinsk front, Mikhail Krom,
argued that ill-considered slogans were being misinterpreted by the sol-
diers in the trenches. ‘Down with the war’ was often being taken to mean
‘dump your weapon and go home’,41 when what was needed was greater
discipline and cohesion.
An international socialist conference figured in the schemas of all
Menshevik factions, although there was no consensus about the par-
ticipants or agenda. Robert Grimm of the Zimmerwaldian International
Socialist Committee, one of the groups seeking to convene an interna-
tional conference, addressed the Menshevik congress on 9 May. His
speech would only have pleased Martov’s faction. He blasted the ‘social
patriotism’ of the Menshevik majority’s decision to enter a government
willing to countenance offensive military operations. The Provisional
Government had no right to claim the mantle of Zimmerwald, Grimm
argued, because ‘a government which seriously desires peace must first of
all declare its willingness to conclude an immediate truce’.42
Unfortunately, Grimm was also trying a bit of non-socialist, traditional-
diplomatic peace-making at the same time. On 12 May he sent a telegram
to the Swiss foreign minister Hoffman outlining the need for peace in
Russia and suggesting that should ‘a German offensive in the East … not
take place, the liquidation [of the war] might be carried out in a relatively
short period’.43 A week later, he received a reply from Hoffmann, relay-
ing German assurances that ‘Germany will not undertake an offensive so
long as an agreement with Russia seems possible’.44 When Hoffmann’s tel-
egram was revealed in the Russian press in early June, Grimm was accused
of being a German agent and promptly deported from Russia, with the
full agreement of the socialist ministers he had criticised so roundly. He
had few defenders in Russia: anything which smelled of a separate peace
was disavowed by everyone.
VIII. The First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, June 1917
Peace was no more in prospect by the time the first congress of soviets
opened in Petrograd on 5 June. Most of the delegates, from across Russia,
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supported the revolutionary-defencist line of the Menshevik-SR major-
ity in the Petrograd Soviet, although the internationalists were well
represented. On the eve of the congress, the internationalist social-dem-
ocratic newspaper Novaya zhizn’ attempted to address the question of
what Russia’s military stance should be before a democratic peace can be
reached? Its leader-writer Vladimir Bazarov argued that since the Allies
would not renounce annexations, Russia should break with them, and
declare that
we are continuing the war on our own account, and will continue it
until such time as our enemies accept our peace terms, not only in rela-
tion to us, but in relation to all belligerent countries. The salvation of
the revolution demands not a separate peace, but a separate war – a
genuinely ‘liberative’ war, not directed against German imperialism,
but against imperialism in general.45
The main effect of this article was to give the revolutionary defencists a
convenient foil at the soviet congress. The Menshevik leader Dan started
his speech introducing the soviet majority motion on the war by demol-
ishing the notion of separate war: ‘only a separate peace can come from a
separate war, not a general peace’.46 Alternatively, if
Russia starts waging war with openly revolutionary and anti-imperi-
alist goals … we shall see our salvation not in the speediest conclusion
of peace, but in the most successful and victorious pursuit of that war.
This separate war will turn into a revolutionary war for the liberation
of Europe and the start of its socialist transformation, as advocated by
the Bolshevik comrades.47
Instead, Dan repeated the familiar formula of the past three months – trying
to shore up the front while pressing the Allies to renounce imperialist
war aims, and working towards a socialist peace conference. Moreover,
he argued, Russia would only carry any weight with the Allied govern-
ments if it had some armed force to deploy,48 and raised the possibility
that offensive action might be one of the ways to boost both the fighting
capacity of the army and Russia’s diplomatic weight.
Dan was followed by Lenin, whose speech was more concerned with
exploiting the revolutionary potential of the war than with finding ways
of ending it quickly:
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We say, the only way out of the war is revolution. Support the revolu-
tion of the classes oppressed by the capitalists, overthrow the class of
capitalists in your own country, and thereby set an example for other
countries.49
As only revolution could end the war, Lenin saw little use in trying to
convene further international socialist conferences to discuss possible
peace plans. As for the bogey of a separate peace, Lenin slew it thus:
We say, no separate peace with any capitalists, particularly with the
Russian capitalists! … We do not recognise any separate peace with
the German capitalists and will enter into no negotiations with them;
but neither do we want a separate peace with the British and French
imperialists.50
The path to peace set out in the Bolsheviks’ motion to the congress was
beguilingly simple. They proposed that the congress itself should seize
power, form a government, and then
immediately appeal to all belligerent governments and separately to the
working classes of these countries, setting out the peace conditions in
full and proposing that peace negotiations be opened immediately …
It will unmask all these governments, make it impossible for them to
maintain their power over the oppressed classes, and clear the path to
the world socialist revolution.51
Speaking after Lenin, Russia’s war minister Aleksandr Kerensky, struck
a very different tone as he outlined the strategy behind the government’s
peace policy:
We are proceeding gradually, obliging both the government of our own
country and the governments of the democratic countries of Europe
gradually to move over to our positions under the influence of a demo-
cratic public opinion which is becoming ever more organised … 52
Kerensky was sure that the government’s foreign policy, which had raised
the question of revising war aims with the Allies, ‘will undoubtedly bring
enormous and positive results’.53 In the meantime, as befitted his Cabinet
position, Kerensky’s main concern was with raising the effectiveness of
the army.
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This was also the concern of Aleksandr Vilenkin, a professional army
officer and political liberal who had joined the People’s Socialists in
1917 so that he could take part in soldiers’ soviets. Vilenkin sardoni-
cally remarked that the congress discussion had shown that the political
course of the soviet majority ‘will not bring us any closer to conclud-
ing peace’,54 but he was particularly scathing about the internationalists’
‘ostrich politics’.
… we need to decide whether to fight or not. If we don’t fight, then – I
shall say those words which clearly frighten everyone – then it’s sepa-
rate peace … And if we don’t want that, then, up to the time when the
German ruling circles are broken, we need to be strong and prepared,
to prevent them from attacking and destroying us.55
Plekhanov, in a long and uncompromisingly pro-war-effort speech,
expressed a fear held by many on both sides of the debate: that Russia
could end up as ‘something like China in Eastern Europe’.56 Plekhanov
related this perspective to a separate peace, others feared it might happen
if either side ‘won’ outright.
The votes of the Menshevik-SR majority at the congress reaffirmed the
policy of the past three months. The fighting capacity of the armed forces
would be bolstered. An offensive would help this and boost Russia’s dip-
lomatic weight. There would be efforts to persuade the Allies to embrace a
peace programme, and a parallel programme of socialist diplomacy aimed
at fostering peace and reconstructing the International. It was not long
before these perspectives started to unravel.
IX. The June Offensive and its aftermath
The military offensive which had been presented as a hypothetical, oper-
ational measure on 9 June was launched on 18 June, while the soviet
congress was still in progress. Russian forces attacked Austrian forces in
Galicia, pushing towards Lvov. A resolution supporting the offensive and
the army was moved at the soviet congress the next morning by Tsereteli,
who claimed that the offensive had shown the world
that the democratic ideals of our domestic and foreign policy have
not only not demoralised the army, as the enemies of the revolution
have tried to claim, but that this enthusiasm has boosted the fighting
capacity of the army. Comrades, this is a turning point in the Russian
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revolution, when it will show the power and force of the new demo-
cratic ideals which have been realised in the rear and at the front.57
Viktor Chernov, supporting Tsereteli, expected that the success of the
offensive would mean that ‘the voice of revolutionary Russia will carry
more weight, will have greater influence, and maybe lead Europe …
towards liquidating the war’.58 However, the omens were not good. A
demonstration in Petrograd on 18 June called by the soviet congress to
support the offensive turned into an anti-war demonstration through a
mass mobilisation of Bolshevik supporters. ‘Enthusiasm’ was clearly not
felt by everyone.
The offensive had some initial successes, but it had faltered by the
end of June. The Austrian and German forces counterattacked, and the
Russian armies were routed. There were widespread reports of pillaging
of Russian villages by groups of Russian soldiers retreating in disarray.
The government and army chiefs put much of the blame on Bolshevik
and internationalist agitation among the troops, insubordination, and the
power of soldiers’ committees to delay implementation of orders while the
troops discussed and voted on them. Military commanders demanded an
end to army democracy. Supreme Commander General Aleksey Brusilov
wrote to Kerensky on 11 July calling for ‘iron discipline in all its pleni-
tude and the death penalty for traitors’;59 the latter measure was enacted
the next day. In the following days military censorship was reintroduced,
and the Bolshevik papers Pravda and Okopnaya pravda (‘Trench Truth’)
were banned. The Petrograd Soviet protested, but to no avail. ‘Democratic
ideals’ at the front were – officially, at least – over.
Besides attempts to reassert control in the army, the government also
took repressive measures against the Bolsheviks in response to unruly
Bolshevik-inspired armed street demonstrations of sailors, soldiers and
workers in Petrograd on 3–5 July 1917. The dé bâ cle at the front and the
disorders in Petrograd led to strong calls for the restoration of order at the
front and in the rear. For a few weeks in the summer, the military leader-
ship was in the political ascendancy in Petrograd. On 19 July, Kerensky
appointed General Lavr Kornilov, a career officer who made little attempt
to present himself as a friend of the revolution, as Supreme Commander
in place of Brusilov.
The generals had few ideas beyond tighter discipline in the front
and rear, the removal of army committees and ‘politics’ from military
affairs, and the hope that these measures might restore the army’s fight-
ing ability. They were unable to make much progress in turning round
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the disintegration of the Russian army, accelerated as it was by the dis-
integration of the Russian economy in the rear. But by their actions they
raised the spectre of ‘counterrevolution’ in soviet circles. Kornilov over-
played his hand at the end of August by moving Cossack troops towards
Petrograd; Kerensky denounced his action as a ‘mutiny’ the Soviet mobi-
lised forces to defend Petrograd and meet Kornilov’s troops. The ‘mutiny’
fizzled out as the Cossacks refused to advance any further. This marked
the end of the military leadership’s brief ascendancy in Petrograd. It also
marked the breakdown of the last vestiges of discipline in the Russian
army, as groups of revolutionary soldiers hunted down ‘Kornilovite’
officers. On 3 September, the soviet Central Executive Committee was
obliged to publish an appeal in Izvestiya to the soldiers: ‘In the interest of
the revolution, refrain from lynching. Use self-restraint, soldiers!’.60
X. The failure of socialist diplomacy
If a successful offensive might have given Russia more weight in pushing
for peace talks, a failed offensive certainly had the opposite effect, as the
fate of the Stockholm peace initiatives showed. The Russian socialists
had placed enormous hopes in socialist diplomacy as a way of breaking
through the logjam of official intergovernmental relations, dominated
as they were across Europe by the very people who bore responsibility
for the war. The idea was very seductive – if a socialist peace conference
succeeded not only could it help secure a just peace, it could also help
reconstruct the International, and massively increase the prestige of the
socialist movement and of revolutionary Russia.
In the spring of 1917 there were three parallel initiatives to call a social-
ist conference in Stockholm. The Dutch delegation to the International
Socialist Bureau, a non-Zimmerwaldian body which declared it ‘adopted
the standpoint of Kerensky and Wilson’,61 resolved to relocate to
Stockholm and call an international conference, to which both majority
and minority socialists from both the Entente and Central powers would
be invited. The Zimmerwaldian International Socialist Committee then
issued an invitation, to the internationalist socialists only, also to meet
in Stockholm. Finally, on 2 May, the Petrograd Soviet issued its appeal
‘to the socialists of all countries’, which also proposed an international
conference. Socialist diplomacy proved to be no less delicate than its bour-
geois counterpart, as wrangling took place over who was to be invited,
who was prepared to sit in the same room as whom, and the question of
whether war guilt should be off-limits or the first item on the agenda. In
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response to the Soviet appeal, Henderson, Thomas and Vandervelde stated
on 22 May that they could not agree to a meeting with German majority
socialist representatives present.62 There was clearly lots of persuading to
be done before any useful conference could even be convened, whatever
its likely outcome. The conferences, originally intended for May, had to
be put off several times.
To try to move things along, the first soviet congress sent a five-man
delegation on a tour around Europe from 16 June, charged with holding
talks with all the socialist party representatives they could meet, and pos-
sibly to combine the soviet initiative with the Dutch-Scandinavian one.
The delegation, led by the social democrat Iosif Goldenberg and the SR
Nikolay Rusanov, travelled via Sweden to Britain, where they met with
Henderson and the Labour leaders, France, where they met socialist and
government leaders, and then Italy. They painstakingly worked to win
majority socialist opinion in Britain and France round to the idea of taking
part in Stockholm; only the Italian socialists were already favourable. The
Russian delegates stuck to the soviet policy of no separate peace, much to
the relief of the British and French majority socialists. This earned them
a favourable reception with majority socialists in London and Paris, but
weakened their position in relation to the governments of those countries.
The prospect of a separate peace was the only remotely credible threat
they could have deployed.63
Even the possibility of a separate peace was losing its force in the after-
math of the June offensive dé bâ cle, as Allied governments effectively wrote
Russia out of their military calculations. The prospects on the Western
front were improving for the Allies after the United States had joined the
war on 6 April, and Germany’s policy of unrestricted submarine warfare
had failed to destroy Allied shipping. The French and British govern-
ments had no further need to humour the soviets – the French government
refused to grant passports for delegates to go to Stockholm, followed on
11 August by the British government. The Stockholm initiative was scup-
pered. The Zimmerwaldians did manage to hold a small conference there
between 5–12 September 1917, but their exclusively internationalist gath-
ering was of little significance to Russia’s peace efforts.
The last gasp of soviet diplomacy in the period of the Provisional
Government took place in early October, in connection with an upcom-
ing Inter-Allied Conference on War Aims, to be held in Paris. The soviet
Central Executive Committee requested to be represented at the talks
by the Menshevik former labour minister Matvey Skobelev. It drafted a
peace plan on which he was to insist, with ‘peace without annexations and
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indemnities on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination’ as its
first point.64 The Provisional Government objected, the Allies protested
against Skobelev attending at all, and Bonar Law commented in the House
of Commons that the conference would be about how to wage the war,
not its aims.65
Even as the Provisional Government entered its death throes, the taboo
on a separate peace remained sacrosanct. One of its final quixotic acts was
to dismiss the war minister General Aleksandr Verkhovsky for having
publicly argued that Russia could no longer fight and therefore had to
conclude peace before calamity struck. He had not actually called for a
separate peace, but even pointing out the obvious truth was unacceptable.
Verkhovsky was sent away on leave on 21 October. Kerensky’s govern-
ment had four days left.
XI. October – annexations, indemnities, but no peace
The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets opened on 25 October, at the
same time as Bolshevik-directed forces were in the process of deposing
Kerensky’s government. This fact overshadowed all other considerations.
It led to a walkout by most of the non-Bolshevik delegates, and the ques-
tion of peace was barely aired at the congress. One speaker who did raise
the issue was the Novaya zhizn’ journalist Boris Avilov, who addressed
the triumphant Bolsheviks:
The Allies refused to talk with Skobelev. They will never accept the
proposition of a peace conference from you. You will not be recognised
either in London or Paris, or in Berlin … You cannot count on the
effective help of the proletariat of the Allied countries … revolution in
Germany [is] impossible during the war … 66
Avilov foresaw only two possible outcomes – either a separate peace with
Germany, or a peace between the Allies and the Central Powers at Russia’s
expense. Trotsky, for the Bolsheviks, responded in full rhetorical flight:
There are only two alternatives; either the Russian Revolution will
create a revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European powers
will destroy the Russian Revolution!67
The decree on peace, one of the first decrees adopted by Lenin’s new
Council of People’s Commissars on 26 October, stuck very much to the
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motion the Bolsheviks had proposed at the first soviet congress in June.
It addressed both the peoples and the governments of all the belligerent
countries, proposed an immediate armistice and the opening of peace
negotiations. It also expressed its confidence that the workers of Britain,
France and Germany ‘by comprehensive, determined and supremely vig-
orous action, will help us conclude peace successfully’.68 The process of
self-demobilisation of Russia’s army through desertion, in the expectation
of peace, continued to gather pace.
Only the German government responded to the call of the decree.
On 2 (15) December 1917 a preliminary armistice agreement was signed
between Soviet and German representatives at Brest-Litovsk. The subse-
quent treaty, also concluded at Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, involved
annexations at Russia’s expense, although officially no indemnities. These
came in a supplementary treaty of 27 August 1918, which obliged Russia
to pay 6,000 million marks ‘as compensation to the loss to Germans caused
by Russian measures’.69
Brest-Litovsk was met with a wave of indignation, not only from the
other political forces in Russia, but also from within the Bolshevik Party,
where Nikolay Bukharin and other ‘left communists’ demanded a revolu-
tionary war. On the right, the treaty symbolised the Bolsheviks’ betrayal
of Russia. As the country collapsed into civil war in the summer of 1918,
and anti-Bolshevik ‘white’ forces and ‘governments’ emerged around
the periphery, rejection of Brest-Litovsk was a common aim of them all,
right up to the armistice on the western front in November 1918. The
fact that none of them had armed forces capable of waging such a war,
and that some of them were thousands of miles from the nearest German
troops, did not seem to matter. A short-lived ‘Provisional All-Russia
Government’ formed in Ufa, in the Urals, on 8 September 1918 included
‘non-recognition of the Brest Treaty’ and ‘continuation of the war against
the German coalition’ as part of its quixotic programme.70
In the event, World War One ended messily on the eastern front, with a
variety of separate peaces and separate wars. Many of those separate wars
were fought on the territory of the former Russian Empire, where the
imperialist war turned into several civil wars. In European Russia, the last
of those wars was not over until 1921.
XII. Conclusion
The Zimmerwald movement was finally buried in March 1919, by the
leaders of its former left wing, at the First Congress of the Communist
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International.71 How should its legacy be assessed? Its major achievement
was to set the terms of Russia’s quest for peace in 1917. It made Russia’s
peace aims far clearer than its war aims after February. But clarity is not
the same as attainability.
As a political slogan, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities on
the basis of self-determination’ was excellent. It neatly encapsulated the
aspirations of those socialists who resisted the lure of national chauvinism.
It was also very attractive to the losing side in the war. A just and honour-
able peace may not be as desirable as victory, but it is much better than
defeat, with all that might entail.
As a political goal, the Zimmerwald slogan presented serious theo-
retical problems: What counts as an annexation? Who has the right to
self-determine, and how? The practical problems were even more serious:
How can everyone be persuaded to sign up to it? Why would the winning
side want to forgo the fruits of victory?
But, alas, as a non-negotiable precondition for concluding peace, the
Zimmerwald slogan was a disaster. For eight months, revolutionary
Russia remained trapped in a war it was losing, with Allies it did not
trust, fighting not in order to win, but in the vain hope of a principled
peace which would give honour and credit to the revolution. No separate
or compromise peace could even be considered. All that time, Russia’s
armed forces were crumbling, its economy was collapsing, and its inter-
nal politics were becoming increasingly polarised and violent. Yet the
Russian revolutionaries of all parties and factions retained their almost
messianic view of the historic role and significance of their revolution,
their conviction that it should provide a political and moral lead to the
working people of the world, and their determination not to besmirch it
by concluding a shabby deal with German imperialism. It blinded them
to one sad, but inescapable, fact: in war, the losers do not get to dictate
the peace terms.
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